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A RECENT Press Release' issued by the Department of State takes
the position that the rearming of Germany is a violation of the
Treaty of Berlin2 in that it deprives the United States of one of the
'Yale School of Law; Instructor in History and Literature, Harvard University 1929-1931.
Grateful acknowledgement is due to Professor Edwin M.l Borchard, whose assistance has
been indispensable.
1. Department of State, Press Release, Saturday, September 22, 1934: Weekly Issue No.
260, Publication No. 641. The first item is captioned "Exportation of Arms and Munitions
to Germany" (released September 18). The release reprints a letter written September 11,
1933, to an aircraft company which had inquired whether it was permissible to sell and
export to Germany an airplane for police use. This letter sets forth:
1) "Article 170 of the Treaty of Versailles, TREATY oF PEACE (1919) 66, reads [in part]
as follows:
"' Importation into Germany of arms, munitions and war material of every kind shall
be strictly prohibited.'
2) "Art. I of the Treaty between the United States and Germany Restoring Friendly
Relations, [U. S. TREATY" SER., No. 658 (1921)], reads as follows:
"'Germany undertakes to accord to the United States, and the United States shall have,
and enjoy, all the rights, privileges, indemnities, reparations, or advantages specified in the
aforesaid Joint Resolution of the Congress of the United States of July 2, 1921, including
all the rights and advantages stipulated for the benefit of the United States in the Treaty
of Versailles which the United States shall fully enjoy notwithstanding the fact that such
Treaty has not been ratified by the United States.'
3) "Article II of the same Treaty reads in part as follows:
"'With a view to defining more particularly the obligations of Germany under the fore-
going Article with respect to certain provisions in the Treaty of Versailles, it is understood
and agreed between the High Contracting Parties: (1) that the rights and advantages
stipulated in that Treaty for the benefit of the United States, which it is intended the
United States shall have and enjoy, are those defined in Section 1, of Part IV, and Parts
V, VI, VIII, IX, X, XI, XII, XIV, and XV.'
4) "Article 170 of the Treaty of Versailles is included in Part V referred to in Article
II, quoted above. Violation of that Article would constitute, therefore, not only a viola-
tion of Germany's obligations to the other parties to the Treaty of Versailles, but also a
vblation of its Treaty obligations to the United States.
5) "'As Germany accepted the decisions of the Conference of Ambassadors', embodied
in a letter of August 21, 1926, addressed to the Secretary General of the League of Nations,
that Article 198 of the Treaty of Versailles (likewise embodied in Part V) should be under-
stood, in part, as meaning, 'The police may not possess aircraft.'
6) "This Government [the United States], under the provisions of Articles I and I of
the Treaty . . . [of Berlin] . . . enjoys all the advantages stipulated in Articles 170 and
198, the importation of military aircraft into Germany or the possession or use of aircraft
by the German police would constitute a violation of the treaty rights of this Government."
(Signed) Cordell Hull
2. Text in 61 CONG. REc. 5769 (1921); 42 STAT. 1939 (1921). The relevant provisions
of the Treaty of Versailles are added to the text in SEN. Doc. No. 70, 67th Cong. 1st Sess,,
Ser. No. 7927 (1921); and in U. S. TREATY SER., No. 658 (1922). The official title of the
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"rights and advantages stipulated for the benefit of the United States"
in the Treaty of Versailles Still more recently the announcement by
the German Government of its intention to restore conscription has been
urged by a section of the American press as a violation of the Treaty
of Berlin and a basis for an American protest, if not more definite action.
It is true that the Treaty of Berlin specifically mentions and by ref-
erence incorporates certain sections of the Treaty of Versailles, includ-
ing Part V (the military clauses), as a reservoir from which rights and
advantages deemed of benefit to the United States or its citizens, might
be claimed; 4 but the suggestion for the first time publicly advanced at
this late date that we deemed the continued disarmament of Germany
to be included among the rights and advantages to which we laid claim
seems startling, perhaps even dangerous; for the assertion of a right
carries with it the implication that action may be taken to enforce it.
It is, therefore, pertinent to examine the circumstances which led up to
the conclusion of the Treaty of Berlin in the form in which it was cast
and to inquire whether its literal text, its interpretation at the time its
ratification was assented to, or a construction thereof according to the
principles of international law justify the conclusion reached by the
State Department Press Release and by the interventionist press.
Chronology of Events leading up to the Treaty of Berlin
Consent to the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles was refused by
the Senate of the United States by a vote of 53-38 on November 19,
1919.' A final attempt to pass the Treaty, amended by the so-called
Lodge reservations, also failed to secure the necessary two-thirds majori-
treaty is "Treaty between the United States and Germany Restoring Friendly Relationsr;
in this article it is referred to as the Treaty of Berlin.
3. Treaty of Berlin, art. H1, 42 STAr. 1943 (1921).
4. Treaty of Berlin: "Article I. Germany undertakes to accord to the United States,
and the United States shall have and enjoy, all the rights, privileges, indemnities, repara-
tions or advantages specified in the aforesaid Joint Resolution of the Congrezs of the
United States of July 2, 1921, including all the rights and advantages stipulated for the
benefit of the United States in the Treaty of Versailles which the United States shall fully
enjoy notwithstanding the fact that such treaty has not been ratified by the United States.
"Article II. With a view to defining more particularly the obligations of Germany under
the foregoing Article with respect to certain provisions in the Treaty of Versalles, it iL
understood and agreed between the High Contracting Parties: (1) That the rights and
advantages stipulated in that Treaty for the benefit of the United States, which it is in-
tended the United States sh have and enjoy, are those defined in Section 1, of Part IV,
and Parts V, VI, VIII, IX, X, XI, XII, XIV, and XV.
"The United States in availing itself of the rights and advantages stipulated in the pro-
visions of that Treaty mentioned in this paragraph will do so in a manner conitent with
the rights accorded to Germany under such provisions." 42 STAT. 1942-3 (1921).
5. 58 ConG. Rac. 8803 (1919).
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ty.6 Towards the end of 1919 Senators Lodge and Knox introduced
several resolutions7 simply stating that the war was over or that peace
again existed between the United States and Germany, but these were
never taken up by the Senate. Finally, on April 1, 1920, Representative
Porter introduced a Joint Resolution terminating the state of war.8
After amendment by the Senate,' it was passed by both bodies1 ° but was
rejected by President Wilson, whose veto failed to be overridden, but
only by a handful of votes in the House.11 Thus, the United States was
forced to remain in a technical state of war with Germany and await the
action of the incoming Republican administration. On April 12, 1921,
President Harding took up the subject in a message to Congress.12 The
next day a Joint Resolution was introduced in the Senate13 and, after
some minor differences had been adjusted, passed by both Houses 14 and
approved by the President on July 2, 1921. "Its effect," according to
the only authority who appears to have written on the subject,
"was not only to give statutory recognition to the state of peace already
actually existent but also to assert large claims on behalf of the United States
and its nationals as against Germany and Austria-Hungary. In so far, it
implicitly appeared to delimit the conditions under which negotiations should
be undertaken with those States. . ... ,
Such a unilateral declaration was, however, deemed insufficient for
the resumption of diplomatic relations with Germany. Therefore, a
treaty was negotiated at Berlin by an American Commissioner, Mr. Ellis
Loring Dresel, and the German Government. This treaty, which incor-
porated sections of the Knox Resolution in its preamble, was signed on
August 25, 1921. It was submitted to the Senate on September 24th by
the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, with two reserva-
tions added by that Committee, and after lengthy debate, during which
various amendments which will be discussed hereafter were rejected,
was consented to on October 18, 1921, by a vote of 66 to 20.10 Ratifica-
tions were exchanged on November 11, 1921, and thus the treaty took
effect just three years after the cessation of hostilities.
6. 59 CONG. REc. 4599 (1920).
7. See, for instance, 59 CONG. Rmc. 544 (Dec. 13, 1919).
8. 59 CONG. REc. 5129 (1920).
9. Id. at 6566, (May 5, 1920).
10. Passed Senate May 15, 1920, 59 CONG. REc. 7102, 7681; passed House May 21, 1920,
59 CoNG. Rxc. 7429.
11. The vote, on May 28, was 220-152 in favor of the resolution. 59 CoNo. REc. 7809,
12. 67 CoNG. REC. 173 (1921).
13. Id. at 188 (1921).
14. Passed House June 30, 1921, 61 CONG. REC. 3261; passed Senate July 1, 1921, 61
CONG. RaE. 3299. Text ibid. and in 42 STAT. 105 (1921).
15. Yntema, The Treaties with Germany and Compensation for War Damage (1923)
23 COL. L. Rv. 511, 512.
16. 61 CoNG. Rac. 6438, 7194 (1921).
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Examination of the Text
Insamuch as the primary reason for the Senate's rejection of the Ver-
sailles Treaty was an aversion to our joining the League of Nations and
as this position seemed to have the support of the country, it is not sur-
prising to find that any connection with the League was repudiated by
Article II, Section 2 of the Treaty of Berlin.' 7 Section 3 excludes such
other parts of the Versailles Treaty as were thought to hold within them
either the danger of foreign entanglements 8 or a subordination of internal
American affairs to League interference.19 On the other hand, the United
States wished to reserve "all rights, privileges, indemnities, reparations,
or advantages" which were stipulated for its benefit under the Treaty of
Versailles; and therefore, in Article Ii, Section 1, it apparently lumped
together substantially all the remaining parts of the Versailles Treaty, '
mentioning, among others, Part V, which deals with the disarmament of
Germany, and with which the State Department Press Release is con-
cerned. The desire effectively to guard material claims is further evi-
denced by Article II, Section 4, of the Treaty of Berlin, which empha-
sizes and reserves this country's privilege to participate in the Repara-
tion Commission, if it elects to do so, and by Section 5, which refers to
that Article of the Treaty of Versailles which deals with prize courts.
It may be asked why the omnibus section of the Treaty of Berlin
made mention of Part V of the Treaty of Versailles if that Part did not
set forth any "rights, privileges," and so forth, stipulated for the benefit
of the United States. The answer is to be found in the lack of precision
with which the Treaty was apparently drafted, and possibly also in the
desire not to narrow the reservoir from which tangible benefits might
17. Part I of the Treaty of Versailles is the Covenant of the League of Nations.
18. The captions of the excluded parts are: II, Boundaries of Germany; Il, Political
Clauses for Europe; -IV, § 2, China; § 3, Siam; § 4, Liberia; § 5, Morocco;
§ 6, Egypt; § 7, Turkey and Bulgaria; § 8, Shantung.
19. Part XIII covered Labor: membership in the League of Nations was a condition
precedent to membership in the body envisaged for the execution of the provisions of this
Part; and the International Labor Office, to be set up under this Part, was stated to be a
part of the organization of the League. (Art. 392).
20. That is, all the parts not excluded by Article II, Sections 2 and 3. The captions of
the incorporated parts are: IV, § 1, German Colonies; V, Military, Naval and Air Clauses;
VI, Prisoners of War and Graves; VIII, Reparation; IX, Financial Clauses; X, Economic
Clauses; XI, Aerial Navigation; XMI, Ports, Waterways, and Railways; XIV, Guarantees;
XV, iscellaneous. Part VII is not mentioned in the Berlin Treaty at all, presumably
because it had become a dead letter by the time this Treaty was negotiated; it is captioned
"Penalties" and contains the "war criminals" clauses. The first of these dealt with the
trial of the Ex-Emperor William II. In January, 1920, the Dutch Government had refused
the Allies' demand for his surrender and later rejected a second demand with the assurance
that precautions would be taken to guard the exile; with this understanding the Allies
declared themselves content. N. Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1920, at 1, col. 3; id. March 6, 1920,
at 3, col. 2; id. March 31, 1920, at 1, col. 4.
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be claimed. That the language of the Treaty does lack precision is
well illustrated by the fact that, although it expressly excludes Part III
of the Treaty of Versailles, which is the part that contains Article 42,
providing that Germany is forbidden "to maintain or construct any for-
tifications" in certain areas near the Rhine, it nevertheless mentions
Part V, in which is found Article 180 stipulating that fortifications
maintained in the same area be dismantled and disarmed. Is it reason-
able to suppose that the drafters intended to make the military stipula-
tions of Part V any more binding than the disavowed provisions of
Part III?1 Further evidence of the fact that reference to Part V was
inserted as a result of careless draftsmanship may be found in the fact
that, although the primary purpose of the Treaty of Berlin was to con-
clude a peace settlement from which should be excluded all reference to
or entanglement with the League of Nations, Part V contains the fol-
lowing references to the League:
Article 164. Up till the time at which Germany is admitted as a member
of the League of Nations the German Army must not possess an armament
greater than the amounts filed in Table No. II ...
Germany agrees that after she has become a member of the League of
Nations the armaments fixed in the said Table shall remain in force until they
are modified by the Council of the League. Furthermore she hereby agrees
strictly to observe the decisions of the Council of the League on this subject.
Article 213. So long as the present Treaty remains in force, Germany
undertakes to give every facility for any investigation which the Council of the
League of Nations, acting if need be by a majority vote, may consider neces-
sary.22
These provisions fill the Treaty of Berlin with inexplicable inconsis-
tencies if German disarmament is to be regarded as a "right, privilege,
indemnity, reparation or advantage" stipulated for our benefit. Under
Article 164 Germany may increase her armaments with the consent of
the Council of the League. But Article II, Section 2, of the Treaty of
Berlin stipulates that this country shall not be bound, unless it expressly
gives its assent, by any action taken by the League, the Council or the
Assembly. Thus, if we were to refuse our assent to a decision of the
Council made under Article 164, which Germany, be it noted, agrees
strictly to observe, we should under the logic of the Press Release reach
the result that Germany would be violating the treaty rights of this gov-
ernment, but not those of the signatories of the Versailles pact. Since
this is obviously absurd, it must be assumed that, as far as Article 164
21. Other similar instances in which "the Treaty of Berlin ignores the essential relations
between the parts of the Treaty of Versailles which it accepts and which it rejects" have
been pointed out in COUNCL oN FOORM RELAois, Suavsr or Aaraaxca FoaRsom Ri-
LATIONS (1928) 468.
22. TEATrY or VsmsAm.as (June 28, 1919) 64, 77.
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is concerned, it was our intention always to assent to any decisions
taken thereunder, decisions which would affect primarily, if not almost
exclusively, European political questions. Yet this is improbable
inasmuch as the principal purpose of signing a separate treaty with Ger-
many was to keep our skirts clear of the League of Nations, especially
in so far as it might tend to entangle us in European political affairs.
Article 213, above quoted, impliedly leaves the determination of Ger-
many's continued compliance with the disarmament clauses under the
control of a bare majority of the Council. The League is, therefore,
constituted the permanent agency to enforce the provisions of Part V.
If we consider the disarmament clauses a "right" or "advantage" stipu-
lated for the benefit of this country, we are bound by our separate
treaty to avail ourselves thereof "in a manner consistent with the rights
accorded to Germany under such provisions."'  The only supervisory
agency to whose investigation Germany, after acquiring League mem-
bership, has agreed to submit her armaments is the Council. Therefore,
should we desire to assert our "right" and to investigate the actual state
of Germany's military, naval and air forces at any time, Germany can
insist that only the Council can do so. For the reasons already stated,
it is inconceivable that we intended to subject to the control and discre-
tion of the League in this manner any rights which we meant to claim.
Article 213 of Part V also stipulated that the disarmament clauses
"for the execution of which a time-limit is prescribed, shall be executed
by Germany under the control of Inter-Allied Commissions specially
appointed for this purpose by the Principal Allied and Associated Pow-
ers." As American representation on these commissions is thus express-
ly provided for, it must, if the recent view of the State Department is
correct, have been one of the "rights and advantages stipulated for the
benefit of the United States." And yet no American, as will be brought
out later, has ever sat on any of these Inter-Allied bodies.
Genesis of the Treaty and Contemporary Interpretations
In order to ascertain what the Senate of the United States understood
the inclusion of Part V to signify at the time when it consented to the
ratification of the Treaty of Berlin, it will be necessary to summarize
authoritative opinions expressed during the post-war efforts at peace-
making.
Secretary Lansing has stated that of all the American delegates at
the Paris Peace Conference only President Wilson favored including
in the Covenant of the League of Nations, which was incorporated as
Part I of the Treaty of Versailles, an "affirmative guaranty," that is,
one involving the contemplated use of force in making good the guar-
23. Treaty of Berlin, art. 1, § 1, par. 2, 42 STAT. 1943 (1921).
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anty of the sovereign rights of the members of the League. 4 Mr.
Lansing, believing that such a provision was "entirely out of harmony
with American ideals, policies and traditions 26 vainly endeavored to per-
suade the President to substitute a negative covenant which amounted
to a mere promise of "hands-off. 2 6 But Mr. Wilson insisted upon writ-
ing his version into Article 10 of the Covenant, the article which was
the chief cause for the Senate's rejection of the Versailles Treaty.
The antipathy with which Article 10 was regarded by the Senate dur-
ing the post-war period was well expressed by Senator Lodge, who was
Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee when it later reported
out the Treaty of Berlin. Speaking of the proposed League in February
of 1919, he said:
"In the main our share in any league must be almost wholly for the benefit
of others. We have the right, therefore, to demand that there shall be nothing
in any agreement for the maintenance of the world's peace which is likely
to produce new causes of difference and dissension ... or put us in a position
where we may be 'forced to serve the ambitions of others. There is no gain for
peace in the Americas to be found by annexing the Americas to the European
system."7
27
And Senator Knox, who, as we shall see, was largely responsible for
the basic formula underlying the Treaty of Berlin, objected to the pro-
posed League on the ground that it carried within it the seed of future
war.
28
It seems clear that the objections made to Article 10 must, in the
minds of those who ratified the Treaty of Berlin, have applied with equal
force to a policy which proclaimed the continued disarmament of Ger-
many a ,concern of our government. However, the conflict of opinion
in the Senate regarding the Versailles Treaty raged to such an extent
around Part I, the Covenant of the League of Nations, that the remain-
ing sections, such as Part V, received scant attention. 9 Nor did the
Porter Resolution,' by which Congress subsequently attempted to make
peace, indicate any tendency to regard the continued disarmament of
Germany as a benefit accruing to the United States. Members of the
House generally were aware of the fact that this resolution had been
drafted by Senator Knox;"0 in fact, Cordell Hull, then a representative
from Tennessee, read a "recent resolution" by Senator Knox,31 which, he
24. LANSING, T=E PEACE N2GOTIATONS (1921) 124.
25. Id. at 82. 27. 57 CoNo. REc. 4527 (1919).
26. Id. at 167. 28. Id. at 4528 (1919).
29. LODGE, T SENXAT AND =E LEAGuE OF NATIONs (1925) 373.
30. See statement of Representative Fields, 59 CONG. REc. 6457 (April 21, 1920).
31. The reference is apparently to the resolution introduced by Senator Knox on De-
cember 13, 1919, and reported out by the Foreign Relations Committee, in the form cited
by Mr. Hull, on December 20, 1919. 59 CoNG. REc. 544 (1919).
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stated, was the pattern for the Porter Resoiution. This early Knox reso-
lution contained the following passage:
"That unless the German Government notifies the Government of the United
States that it acquiesces in and confirms irrevocably to the United States all
undertakings and covenants contained in the Treaty of Versailles conferring
upon or assuring to the United States or its nationals any rights, powers, or
benefits whatsoever, and concedes to the United States all rights, privileges,
indemnities, reparations and advantages to which the United States would
have been entitled if it were a ratifying party to said treaty, the President of
the United States shall have power, by proclamation, to prohibit commercial
intercourse between the United States and Germany, and the making of loans,
or credits, and the furnishing of financial assistance or supplies to the German
Government, or the inhabitants of Germany, directly or indirectly, by the Gov-
ernment of the United States or the inhabitants of the United States. 7ms
Mr. Hull was undoubtedly correct in asserting that Senator Knox was
the father of the resolution wherein occurs for the first time the phrase
"all rights, privileges, indemnities, reparations and advantages to which
the United States would have been entitled" had it ratified the Versailles
Treaty. And this phrase was carried practically verbatim into the Porter
Resolution, the final version of which declared:
"That until by treaty or act or joint resolution of Congress it shall be deter-
mined otherwise, the United States, although it has not ratified the Treaty of
Versailles, does not waive any of the rights, privileges, indemnities, reparations
or advantages to which it and its nationals have become entitled under the terms
of the armistice signed November 11, 1918, or any extensions or modifications
thereof or which under the Treaty of Versailles have been stipulated for its
benefit as one of the principal allied and associated powers and to which it is
entitled."33
Senator Knox's interpretation of what these rights, and so forth, were is,
therefore, of primary importance. He gave it at some length when the
Porter Resolution reached the Senate. But before considering his view,
let us set forth the opinions expressed in the House, so that a chrono-
logical presentation may be made of all the utterances in Congress which
tend to throw any light upon contemporary congressional interpretation
of the Treaty of Berlin and its precursors.
Those members of the House who spoke in favor of the Porter Reso-
lution considered American rights carefully safeguarded, believing that
there was no danger of any loss on account of the operations of the
Alien Property Custodian or under the Trading With the Enemy Act,3'
or stating that the recognition of our rights under the Versailles Treaty
was desirable for the welfare of the United States and its citizens because
32. Id. at 960. 33. Id. at 6493.
34. Representative Huddleston, in id. at 5351 (April 8, 1920).
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they would pave the way toward a settling of business conditions and to-
ward the resumption of unhampered trade.8 As one of its opponents
Mr. Hull stated:
"I can scarcely conceive of a more dishonorable attitude before the world
than that in which this resolution would place the United States Government
and the American people. It places us in the attitude of rejecting the treaty
negotiated at Versailles and signed by Germany and all our allied Govern-
ments, but at the same time demanding of the German Government that it shall
comply with the terms of the treaty in so far as they bestow benefits upon the
United States and its citizens. It would be impossible to express or imagine
the amazement, hatred, contempt, and ridicule with which the allied govern-
ments and enlightened nations of the world over would view our Government
and our people if this resolution should be passed ... And yet this is precisely
the pusillanimous proposal that would be made to Germany after deserting our
allies . "..,6
It is difficult to conceive that Mr. Hull could have viewed the Porter
Resolution as a "pusillanimous proposal" by which we would have been
"deserting our allies", if he had interpreted it as contemplating Ameri-
can insistence upon Germany's continued compliance with the military
clauses of the Versailles Treaty. It would therefore appear that the dis-
armament of Germany, which the Department of State some fourteen
years later was to consider a treaty right, was not regarded by Mr. Hull
in 1920 as one of the "benefits bestowed upon this country and its citizens
by the Treaty of Versailles", and reserved to us by provisions of the sort
contained in the Porter Resolution which he was then attacking. Certain
it is that his Democratic colleagues in the House opposed the Resolu-
tion solely because in their opinion it failed to protect wholly material
interests such as the American title to the seized German ships and to
the funds in the hands of the Alien Property Custodian, the costs of the
Army of Occupation, the payment of claims arising out of the sinking
of the "Lusitania" and other pecuniary claims, the provisions in favor of
manufactures and commerce stipulated in Article 274 of the Versailles
Treaty, the question of private property rights and interests in the
enemy countries, matters pertaining to contracts of various kinds, nego-
tiable instruments and fire, life, and marine insurance, all of which were
covered in Part X of the Versailles Treaty, and other material rights
and benefits of a kindred nature." Only one representative, Mr. Ayres
of Kansas, referred to any section of Part V, and then to Article 173,
providing for the abolition of universal compulsory military service in
Germany, in his list of rights which this country had under the Treaty
35. Representative Rogers, in id. at 5361 (April 8, 1920).
36. Id. at 5412 (April 9, 1920).
37. See, for example, the remarks of Representatives Linthicum, Flood and Ferris at 59
CoxG. Rae. 5348, 5871, and 6227, respectively.
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of Versailles; and, since the next example that he cited was the war
criminals clause, which even at that early date had become a practical
nullity,38 his observations do not seem entitled to great weight. The
minority report from the House Committee of Foreign Affairs, which
accompanied the Resolution to the Senate, did not embody Mr. Ayres'
objection; it dealt exclusively with financial and material rights or inter-
ests and expressed the same fears mentioned with regard to their insuffi-
cient protection under the Resolution, especially since it made no pro-
vision for the renunciation by Germany of the Prussian-American Trea-
ties of 1785 and 1828 which, in case of war, gave the merchants of either
country the right of free departure with all their property.-"
It was possibly for the purpose of meeting these latter objections that
the Senate amended the Porter Resolution so that, in addition to certain
changes not here material, it was made to contain a long proviso expressly
stipulating for the retention of the Alien Property Custodian funds until
Germany had made suitable provision for the satisfaction of all claims
of American nationals, the guarantee of most favored nation treatment,
the confirmation of all fines and forfeitures imposed by the United States
during the war, and the waiving of German pecuniary claims, "any exist-
ing treaty between the United States and Germany to the contrary not-
withstanding." 40
Senator Knox, who evidently regarded this proviso as a concrete sanc-
tion for the "rights, privileges, indemnities, reparations [and] advan-
tages" referred to in the section to which it was appended,' stated that it
had been drafted to secure those rights which the United States had a
"right to expect and demand." Since Knox was, as we have seen, the
father of the Porter Resolution, his remarks on this point are cited in
full as affording the best evidence of what these contemplated rights
were:
"By the treaty [of Versailles] we became, as one of the principal allied and
associated powers, with our associates co-owners of the following property,
rights, and privileges: A part of German territory in Europe and all of Ger-
many's territorial overseas possessions; of parts of Schleswig in trust for Ger-
many or Denmark; of all the German national property, imperial and state,
and the private property of the ex-Emperor and other royal personages, with-
out compensation for that in the colonies, with compensation for that in Memel;
of the public utilities in areas ceded to the principal allied and associated
powers; of all German cables, reaching all over the world; of practically all
German merchant marine shipping and of certain portions of her inland ship-
38. No Germans were ever handed over to the Allies under the provisiona of this arti-
cle. An agreement whereby a certain number were to be tried by the German Supreme
Court was concluded shortly after this debate took place.
39. 59 CozG. REc. 6491 (May 4, 1920). On this subject see also the remarks of Senator
McCumber. Id. at 6855 (May 11, 1920).
40. Id. at 6492.
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ping; of bonds in the total fixed amount of 100,000,000,000 gold marks, and
of a commitment for an indefinite further issue; of certain amounts of gold
specified; of German claims against Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey;
of a maximum of 200,000 tons of shipping per year to be built by Germany;
and as single owner in our own right of all American securities, certificates,
deeds, or other documents of title, including shares of stock, debentures, de-
benture stocks, or other obligations of any company incorporated in accord-
ance with our laws, as also all materials, and so forth, which may have been
taken from our citizens during the war.
"By this same 'treaty our citizens became the beneficiaries, fully and com-
pletely, with the nationals of other allied and associated powers, of restrictions
accepted, grants made, and obligations incurred by Germany with reference to
her external commerce in the matter of duties, charges, and commerce restric-
tions, reciprocity treaties, customs provisions, shipping, freedom of transit, free
zones, the internationalization of her great internal waterways, railway transit,
and the Kiel canal. We are likewise the beneficiary of the principle accepted
by Germany that Germany is responsible for herself and for her allies for all
loss and damage to which the allied and associated Governments and their
nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them
by the aggression of Germany and her allies, and this includes-under the
broad wording of the provision-not alone the loss and damage resulting from
the operation of Germany and her allies, but loss suffered as the result of the
allied and associated powers.
"While not now waiving our rights to all the foregoing, ultimately we want,
sir, only those parts which will provide for the compensation of our citizens
for the losses they suffered because of the war, and those parts which will
assure them equality of treatment with the nationals of the most favored nation
in all matters pertaining to residence, business, profession, trade, navigation,
and commerce. It is to secure these, which we have a right to expect and de-
mand, that the proviso of the resolution before us is drafted."4'.
It is clear that the rights which Senator Knox had in mind comprised
only the reimbursement for past losses suffered by, and the securing of
future commercial benefits for the United States and its citizens. Not
even the most liberal construction can read into his remarks any refer-
ence to Part V of the Versailles Treaty, and certainly none to the dis-
armament of Germany.
When the Democratic administration yielded place to a Republican
administration, the aversion of the American government toward involve-
ment in European affairs was, if anything, increased. In his message to
Congress of April 12, 1921, President Harding declared that, although
account had to be taken of the fact that our interests had been woven
into the Versailles settlement in such a way that it could not be ignored
in a separate treaty of peace, he nevertheless proposed accepting the
confirmation of our rights and interests as provided for in that treaty
41. Id. at 6565 (May 5, 1920). (Italics ours).
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only on the assumption that this could be accomplished "by such explicit
reservations and modifications as will secure our absolute freedom from
inadvisable commitments." Furthermore, he proclaimed, "Helpfulness
does not mean entanglement, and participation in economic adjustments
does not mean sponsorship for treaty commitments which do not concern
us, and in which we will have no part."
At the President's suggestion, Senator Knox introduced what is now
known as the Joint Resolution, which, as has been stated, was passed
by both Houses 4 and approved by President Harding. Of the two
sections which were later incorporated in the Preamble of the Treaty
of Berlin the first reads as follows:
"Sec. 2. That in making this declaration, and as a part of it, there are
expressly reserved to the United States and its nationals any and all rights,
privileges, indemnities, reparations, or advantages, together with the right to
enforce the same, to which it or they have become entitled under the terms of
the armistice signed November 11, 1918, or any extensions or modifications
thereof; or which were acquired by or are in the possession of the United States
of America by reason of its participation in the war or to which its nationals
have thereby become rightfully entitled; or which, under the treaty of Ver-
sailles, have been stipulated for its or their benefit; or to which it is entitled
as one of the principal allied and associated powers; or to which it is entitled
by any Act or Acts of Congress; or otherwise."'13
The other section follows the wording of the proviso added to the Porter
Resolution discussed above, with but minor alterations occasioned by
the inclusion of claims against Austria-Hungary.
The debate on this resolution yields a little more specific information
as to the attitude of Congress regarding foreign entanglements and re-
garding the question of German disarmament itself. Senator King was
the first to shed light on the problem. In opposing the resolution he
stated:
"The position of the supporters of the Knox resolution is that when the
armistice was signed we had no further business in Europe, whether or not...
the defeated powers (were) compelled to sign a treaty and execute its terms
were no concern of this Government. ' 44
And, most significantly, Senator Nelson objected to the resolution in
the following terms:
"By this resolution we insist upon full reparation for ourselves, but are
wholly oblivious as to whether our allies . .. secure any reparation at all. We
are also by this resolution wholly oblivious to the disarmament of Germany-a
matter most vital to the future peace of the world.... Under this peace resolu-
tion we have no ground for insisting on the removal of this menace.7 4
The Senators who favored the resolution, including certain Demo-
42. 61 CONG. R1c. 173 (1921). 44. 61 Co.Go. rEC 8327 (April 30, 1921).
43. 42 STAT. 1940 (1921). 45. Id. at 748 (April 28, 1921).
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crats, were wholly desirous of freeing this country from Wilsonian treaty
commitments. Senator Shields, after agreeing with a previous speaker
that the Covenant of the League had been the issue in the 1920 election
and that it had been overwhelmingly rejected, expressed the opinion that
it was so intertwined with the Versailles Treaty that it was impossible to
execute the latter without the League of Nations.
"Thus the infirmities of the Covenant of the League of Nations," he con-
tinued, "affect the treaty to such an extent and so inextricably as to make the
document, the treaty proper, hopelessly and incurably bad, and the only pos-
sible thing to do is to scrap the entire document, in my opinion. As to the
apprehension that the resolution will have that effect, I have understood that
that is the object of it, and that is why I am going to vote for it."4 3
Senator Lodge, the Republican leader in the Senate, agreed that that was
his understanding, also.47
In the House, Representative Huddleston, another Democrat, again
supported the endeavor to make a peace not involving "chronic inter-
meddling." He asserted, speaking of the Treaty of Versailles,
"Few or none of its provisions are for our benefit; they relate in chief to
reparations for Britain and France and to international boundaries-to Euro-
pean balances of power and to a multitude of delicate questions in which we
have no interest. The treaty carries the seed of a hundred wars."'48
Representative Fish, in supporting the resolution, plainly voiced the
Congressional sentiment against the United States undertaking to enforce
the disarmament of Germany.49
Why, then, in the face of the sentiments of members of both Houses,
and in the face of the surge of anti-entanglement feeling which swept
the Republican party into power in 1920, did the Treaty of Berlin incor-
porate by reference that part of the Versailles Treaty which deals with
German disarmament? The excerpts thus far quoted, which have omit-
ted no mention of any opinion considering such disarmament a concern
of the United States, seem to substantiate the surmise hazarded in the
discussion of the text of the treaty, to wit, that after the exclusion of all
parts of the Versailles Treaty which were thought to contain the danger
of future European entanglements, American rights under all the remain-
ing parts were claimed and these apparently innocuous parts were
lumped together in Article II, Section 1 of the Berlin Treaty.
The administration sought to comply with the Knox resolution to such
an extent that it even incorporated parts of it in the Treaty of Berlin.
When the German Government requested a more specific definition of
the rights, privileges and so forth reserved by the United States, it is
understood that the American Commissioner, Mr. Dresel, did little to
46. Id. at 838 (April 30, 1921). (Italics ours).
47. Ibid.
48. Id. at 2455 (June 11, 1921). 49. Id. at 2459 (June 11, 1921).
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clarify the situation, merely stating that it was the intention of Congress
that America and its citizens should not be at any disadvantage as com-
pared with its co-belligerents.
The same perplexity which worried the German Government was felt
by certain members of the Foreign Relations Committee. When the
Treaty was submitted to the Senate for ratification, Senator Borah, for
example, observed:
"I do not believe that it is possible for any lawyer, trained though he is in
the analysis of legal instruments, to tell the American people what our rights
would be under the treaty. I know that I have not been informed of them,
and I think one of the ablest lawyers in the United States was before the
committee...
"Suppose France is not satisfied with Germany's demobilization and insists
that other beneficiaries of the treaty help to enforce this provision of the treaty;
what position would we be in under this treaty? I venture to say that no
man can define what our position would be. Technically we could refuse, but
practically we could not ignore her request.
"Under section 170 [of Part V] we have importation of arms, munitions
and war materials of every kind prohibited. Suppose some of the beneficiaries
of the treaty should insist on enforcement of this provision; what would be our
position towards France and England under this treaty? We claim certain
rights and privileges. Those dovetail into these numerous conditions of
Part V.")5°
From the last two sentences it would appear that Senator Borah re-
garded Part V as containing, not rights and privileges, but rather only
onerous "conditions" correlative to the rights and privileges set forth
in other parts of the Versailles Treaty. He was apparently apprehen-
sive that reference to the Treaty of Versailles would make it appear that
all the rights, privileges, indemnities, reparations and advantages thus
reserved were being secured to us by virtue of the activities of the Allies
in crippling Germany militarily and that from this would arise a moral
obligation to cooperate in enforcing the military clauses of Part V. The
same concern was expressed by several other Senators, like Watson5'
and La Follette, 2 who feared that the United States might be called
upon to enforce these clauses not for our own benefit, but for the politi-
cal advantage of certain European Powers.
Senator Moses, an important factor in the drafting of the Treaty of
Berlin, sought to allay such fears by saying:
"We have asked nothing beyond the restoration of certain rights belonging
to us by international law and freely accorded to us in the prior days of peace
and mere recompense for the actual monetary cost of maintaining our portion
of the army of occupation in Germany since the signing of the armistice nearly
50. Id. at 5776 (Sept. 24, 1921).
51. Id. at 6379. 52. Id. at 6436 (Oct. 18, 1921).
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three years ago. To these should perhaps be added our natural desire to
safeguard ourselves against an adverse application of mandatory provisions
in lands to which we hold an undivided fifth interest in fee, and the claims not
yet formulated for reparation to be accorded to our destroyed or damaged ship-
ping, or to our nationals, who in one way or another directly suffered as a con-
sequence of the operations of war.
"None of these, however, is a problem which necessarily brings us in contact
with any of the machinery which the treaty of Versailles sets up; one of them,
indeed, has already been provided for by the armistice. None of them may not
be settled by direct negotiation and without recourse to any entanglement which
one group of opponents of this instrument says we cannot avoid and which an-
other group of its opponents says we are cravenly seeking to evade; and none
of them has any point of contact with the nebulous jurisdiction of the League
of Nations.
... having freed ourselves from the onerous obligations and implications
which its (the Treaty of Versailles') involved articles contain, I can see no
reason why an irreconcilable should withhold his assent to its ratification.
".... This treaty.., contains all that the American people sought when the
war ended, all that they indorsed in the last election, all that any of us hoped
to attain when we took our stand in opposition to the treaty of Versailles, and
all that Congress had in mind when adopting the Knox resolution, which was
this treaty's forerunner."53
Senator Kellogg, on the other hand, seemed to interpret the Treaty
in the sense recently advanced by the State Department and the public
press. Mr. Kellogg's remarks on the point follow:
"Take Part V of the Versailles Treaty. By this treaty we also accept the
rights and advantages stipulated for the benefit of the United States of the
Versailles Treaty. Part V provides for . . . . [summarizing the provisions]
"We carried on the war, at great sacrifice of life and of money, in order that
Germany might not again imperil the peace of the world. Are we not inter-
ested in her disarmament? Is there any reason why we should not take the
benefits to us of disarming Germany so that she may not again inflict such a
calamity upon the world?" 54
Even this language, however, is sufficiently ambiguous to leave room for
considerable speculation whether Senator Kellogg was really maintain-
ing that the disarmament of Germany in which we were "interested"
was a "right, privilege, indemnity, reparation, or advantage" within the
terms of the Knox-Porter Resolution. If he was, only Senator Pomerene
seems to have shared that view.55
53. Id. at 6059-60 (Oct. 5, 1921) (Italics ours).
54. Id. at 5861 (Sept. 28, 1921).
55. Later in the debate, on October 18th, Senator Pomerene also inquired whether we
were not "interested" in the stipulations of Part V. He picked a number of examples, at
least two of which must be regarded as unfortunate choices if he wished to make the point
that their observance was to be considered as among our treaty rights. One was the dis.
armament and dismantling of the fortifications near the Rhine which, as pointed out in
in the text, was a provision which we rejected when we excluded Part III. The other, in
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It is true that certain Democratic Senators, Walsh of Montana and
Hitchcock,5 in attacking the Treaty of Berlin, construed the inclusion
of Part V in a somewhat similar manner, although reaching conclusions
widely different from those of Mr. Kellogg. Senator Walsh remarked,
"Part V of the treaty of Versailles deals with the disarmament of Germany.
Its provisions are intended to make and to keep her militarily impotent. There
is therein no reference to any 'rights' or 'advantages' or 'privileges' accru-
ing to the United States except the 'right' or 'privilege' to have Germany
no longer a menace to the peace of the world. The subject of indemnities and
reparations is dealt with in an entirely separate part of the treaty of Versailles,
and there is nothing in Part V referring either generally to that subject, or
according to the United States, either indemnity or reparation.157
In other words, Senator Walsh spelled out the "right," one would judge,
merely because he felt that the inclusion of Part V in the Berlin Treaty
must mean that it contained within it, because of the context, some right
or advantage stipulated for the benefit of the United States. Having
said this, he examined in great detail the full extent to which Part V dis-
armed the vanquished nation to the end that peace might prevail and
argued that it was, "evidently the theory of this treaty that the United
States is concerned in maintaining the peace of Europe, . . .,T
But it must be remembered that Senator Walsh, a strong supporter of
Wilson's pro-League policy, could undoubtedly be relied upon to adopt
and point out any interpretation of the Treaty which might tend to force
his opponents, the isolationists, into the inconsistent position of advo-
cating intervention in European affairs. Moreover, the Senator used
language which indicated that he really regarded Part V as imposing
disabilities on Germany and not privileges on the United States, for he
said:
"Unlike some other divisions of the treaty which deal with many matters in
which the United States has no interest, at least no appreciable interest, but
contain some stipulations out of which some right, privilege, or advantage ac-
crues or may accrue to the United States, Part V is devoted exclusively to the
disarmament of Germany and to the means of preventing her recrudescence
as a military power."57
And finally, he indicated plainly that he construed the military clauses
as placing heavy responsibilities rather than conferring beneficial rights
upon the United States. Was this country, he inquired,
"prepared to assume the responsibility of such a treaty with Germany? ...
Suppose that Germany should flagrantly disregard the covenants she will have
entered into with us should this treaty become effective; ... are the people
which we certainly evinced none of the "interest" which the Senator asumed, v.was Article
203 dealing with the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control, on which the United States
has not at any time been represented. See infra, note 85.
56. 61 CONG. Rac. 6366 (Oct. 17, 1921).
57. Id. at 6248-9, 6250, 6251 (Oct. 12, 1921).
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of the United States prepared to undertake to coerce her into abandonment of
such a policy? ...
"It will not do to say we take only such advantages as accrue to us under
the Versailles treaty; we assume none of the responsibilities it imposes. In thif
instance, at least, we cannot escape the responsibility. Are we prepared to say
to the other nations interested that we are ready to join them in keeping Ger-
many in military impotence in accordance with the provisions of the treaties
... ? Is it the purpose of those who stand sponsor for this treaty to commit
the country to the renewal of the war with Germany should she disregard the
provisions of the treaty under consideration, and less drastic procedure should
prove unavailing, or is it expected, in the light of recent history, that she will
hereafter scrupulously and conscientiously adhere to her treaty obligations,
whatever course her view of her interest may dictate or suggest, so that neither
complaint nor compulsion will be necessary?"5 7
He continued by stating that such a covenant could not be harmonized
with the avowed Republican policy against interference in European
quarrels:
"Whatever remote or highly contingent interest we may have in the obser-
vance of those provisions of the treaty before us, they are primarily intended
not for our protection but for the protection of the immediate neighbors of
Germany ...
"I repeat that the Senator who taunted his Republican colleagues with aban-
doning their contentioii of the wisdom of non-interference in European affairs
is correct in the view he takes. The only difference between us is that he
contends that we should not go in at all; I, that we do not go far enough.. )17
Senator Walsh then insisted that if we undertook to keep Germany
in a state of inferiority in a military sense, we must assure a disarmed
Germany from unprovoked attack, and offered an amendment to this
effect."8
"... I do insist," he said, "that, unless we are prepared to join with other
nations in giving Germany some assurance of protection against unprovoked
invasion, we should leave to such other nations the obligation to see that she
remains disarmed.157
Thus by indirection he exposed as unfounded the dubious claim, ad-
vanced, if at all, only by Senators Kellogg and Pomerene, that a "right,"
"privilege" or "advantage" for this country might be discovered in
Part V.
58. The amendment read: "In view of the undertaking of the Government of Germany,
recited in Part V of the Treaty of Versailles, to disarm and to remain disarmed, except
as therein set forth, the right and advantage accruing from which undertaking is by th3
treaty specifically reserved to the United States, it agrees that so long as Germany shall
observe the obligations of the said Part V the United States will join with the signatories
of the said treaty of Versailles in any steps that may be mutually agreed upon to protect
from invasion the territory of Germany as by the said treaty of Versailles defined or as
delineated thereunder." Id. at 6361 (Oct. 17, 1921).
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In the course of the debate on the Walsh amendment Senator Borah
interjected the following prophetic words:
" .... It would seem to be entirely equitable, and, entirely honorable, if Ve
are to disarm Germany and to insist upon her remaining disarmed, that we
should protect Germany against invasion or interference on the part of other
powers. I have no doubt, for the evidence accumulates every day... that the
fundamental foreign policy of certain of the great nations of Europe is to
disarm Germany and then to dismember Germany. It is perfectly apparent
that they will not feel at ease until Germany is Balkanized and restored to the
position which she held prior to the time when Bismarck united Germany in
one great empire. I entertain no doubt that that is the policy, well grounded
and intelligently conceived, and that it will be determinedly executed. Such a
policy means economic ruin to Europe and turmoil and strife without end.';0
He went on to say, however, that as he was opposed to involving this
country in European affairs, he could not vote for the Walsh amendment
but concluded: "I would, however, very readily support an amendment
to eliminate from the pending treaty the references to Part V of the
Treaty of Versailles."' 9
Senator Walsh agreed that if his amendment were not accepted he
would move to strike out the reference to Part V." Such a motion,
however, was never made, although the Walsh amendment was snowed
under by a vote of 71-6.6o The Senator then offered another amendment
obligating the United States to use its good offices to prevent an unjusti-
fiable invasion of Germany. The administration Senators now took a
hand in the debate. Senator Lenroot denied that Part V had been made
a part of the pending treaty, asserting that the United States had merely
been given the rights thereunder which it would have had as a signatory
of the Versailles Treaty, to be exercised consistently with the rights
accorded to Germany under that pact. When pressed by Senator King
to state whether this meant that the United States would have to defend
Germany if she were attacked, Mr. Lenroot gave a somewhat confused
reply. Senator Lodge, the party leader, came to his colleague's support
with the brief statement,61 "We are not bound to assume any of those
rights or privileges. We are left entirely free." Surely the phrase
"bound to assume" indicates clearly that Senator Lodge regarded the
stipulations of Part V as a burden not a benefit. Not one of the Repub-
lican majority indicated that there was any intention that the United
States should undertake such a task. No one bothered to make a real
answer to the arguments of the Senators who sought to construe the
Treaty of Berlin in this manner. Their contention was not taken seri-
ously, as is perhaps best demonstrated by the fact that the second Walsh
amendment, also, mustered only six votes .
2
59. Id. at 6362.
60. Id. at 6364.
61. Id. at 6365.
62. Id. at 6367.
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Senator Walsh was possibly right in contending that there would be a
moral obligation on the part of the United States to come to Germany's
aid in the case of an unprovoked attack upon her, if Part V meant to
the United States what he argued. But the other Senators seem to have
rejected his view of American rights and certainly of American obliga-
tions. The conclusion therefore seems inescapable that only a handful
of Senators considered the disarmament of Germany one of the reserved
rights or privileges. As a further piece of evidence, it is to be noted that
Senator Walsh's argument is sound, that if we meant that the disarma-
ment of Germany was vital to us, then we were interfering deeply in
European affairs. But the Republican majority did not think of support-
ing such an entanglement; its whole policy and its appeal to the country
had been directed against precisely that sort of thing. Therefore, Part V
cannot have been regarded by them as an American "right" or "privi-
lege." Furthermore, Senators Lenroot, Walsh, and Hitchcock seemed to
believe that the reciprocity which Germany could claim implied an obliga-
tion to defend her in case of attack; but their view was not accepted.
Under such circumstances and taking the debate as a whole, the inference
is justified that the Senate rejected the suggestion that the United States
would ever claim that German disarmament was a "right, privilege or
advantage" reserved for its benefit.
Senator Reed of Missouri, after the Walsh amendments had been dis-
posed of, expressed himself as shocked that a guaranty for the protec-
tion of Germany should ever have been offered on the floor of the Sen-
ate, but admitted the cogency of Walsh's arguments to the effect that the
Treaty of Berlin made us a party to the controversies of the Old World
and that thereby we obligated ourselves to join the Allies should they
propose to enforce compliance by Germany of Part V. His amendment
to the effect that the United States assumed no obligations under or
with respect to the Versailles treaty was, however, defeated by a vote
of 66-7.63 Senators Reed and Walsh seem to have had in mind the very
dangers to which the State Department's Press Release exposes the
United States. Yet the heavy vote against their amendments must have
meant that, in the minds of the majority, such dangers did not exist, and
the treaty was no doubt ratified on that assumption.
Finally a word should be said about the second of the cautionary
reservations added to the Treaty of Berlin by the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, which reads:
"Subject to the further understanding . . . that the rights and advantages
which the United States is entitled to have and enjoy under this treaty embrace
the rights and advantages of nationals of the United States specified in the
joint resolution or in the provisions of the treaty of Versailles, to which this
treaty refers."64
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The Knox Resolution had included "nationals" but the word was omit-
ted in Article I, Section 1, of the Berlin Treaty. Senator Pomerene,
the sponsor of this reservation, explained that in the Knox Resolution
". .. the fact that there were two classes of claims, one belonging to the
Government, the other belonging to our nationals, such as the claims of our
nationals arising out of the sinking of the Lusitania, the Suffolk, and a hundred
or more other vessels.
"Now, when it comes to the drafting of the treaty between the United States
and Germany we used simply the phrase "the United States," ignoring entirely
the nationals. It seems to me that under the rules of legal construction, when
we had before us the two classes of claims and in the contract or treaty of peace
we only referred to one, certainly a very strong legal argument could be made
to the effect that it was the intention of the draftsmen to exclude the other
class."6
It thus seems that even this Senator, who on the last day of the debate
asserted that we were interested in Part V,11 seems to have considered
that the "rights, privileges, indemnities, reparations or advantages"
which were to inure to our benefit were primarily claims for the reim-
bursement of public and private expenditures or losses occasioned by
the war.
The Treaty Construed in Accordance with International Law
Such an interpretation of the five consecutive words "rights, privi-
leges, indemnities, reparations, or advantages" is wholly in accord with
one of the recognized principles of construction of all written instru-
ments, namely, the principle of association in interpretation embodied
in the maxim noscitur a sociis. The sense of particular words is often
greatly influenced by their association with other words and clauses.
Thus, they may import a conventional sense and have great scope when
so used without restriction in the context, but be susceptible of widely
different applications when rendered more specific by accompanying
provisions expressive of a particular intention or limited application.
The following examples are among those given in a leading treatise on
the subject:6"
"The expression, for instance, of.'places of public resort assumes a very dif-
ferent meaning when coupled with 'roads and streets' from that which it would
have if the accompanying expression was 'houses'. In an enactment respecting
houses 'for public refreshment, resort and entertainment,' the last word was
understood to refer to, not a theatrical or musical or other similar performance,
but something contributing to enjoyment of the 'refeshment'."
Similarly, the use of the word "rights" in conjunction with "privi-
leges," "indemnities," "reparations" and "advantages" qualifies its mean-
65. 2 SUTxHnRAsN, STATUTEs AND STATUTORY CONSmUCnO (2d ed. 1904) § 414, wbiao
view has been adopted in this paragraph.
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ing in the sense that it denotes some positive benefit, something tangible
flowing to the United States, with regard to past or future financial or
commercial adjustments with Germany; but the context will not admit
of an interpretation which would embrace the intangible moral interest
that Germany shall remain disarmed, with its implication that the United
States might be requested to go to war again if Part V were violated.
This principle is also known as the ejusdem generis rule. Whereas an
authority has expressed doubt whether this rule "is applicable in the
construction of a document such as the Treaty of Versailles to which
twenty-seven states are parties," because in the civil law the rule of
ejusdem generis is not recognized to be so fundamental and universal as
to be communis juris,66 yet the same writer, in commenting on a decision
of the Mixed Claims Commission, a body set up under the Treaty of Ber-
lin, indicates that a recognition of this rule in construing an agreement
made between only two parties, the United States and Germany, is per-
fectly proper.66
Disregarding entirely the established maxim that ambiguous language
may properly be construed against the party which drafted it,67 we may
reasonably fall back on plain common sense, not an exotic ingredient of
the law, which negatives any such interpretation as the Press Release
espouses. Nor should the well-known rule that change of circumstances
may modify or dissolve the obligations of treaties be overlooked.08 Inter-
66. McNair, Application of the Ejusdem Generis Rule in International Law (1924) 5
BrusHr YrAR Boor or LmmATOxAL LAW 181-2. The decision referred to is Adminis-
trative Decision No. I1, reprinted in (1924) 18 Am. J. Tnr. L. 177, 184, and covers an
interpretation of the phrase "or otherwise" as used in Section 5 of the Knox Resolution,
which was made an integral part of the Treaty of Berlin.
67. Text-writers: 2 VATTEL, La DRorr DES GENS OU PRIgcipas DE Lox NATURELLE (1758)
§ 264; 2 PBILLmoRE, R. J., Coa:mmTARIEs Upox INTERNATIOzTAL LAW (1854) 93; WooL-
SaY, INmovucroN TO =E STUDY OF INTEATIONAL LAW (1860) § 113; 2 PRADIER-FODfR6,
P. L. E. TRAIrT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (1885) § 1188; 2 VMRToN, A DiozsT or
INTERNATIONAL LAW oF THE UNITED STATES (1886) § 133; 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL
LAW (4th ed. 1928) § 554. By international tribunals it has been accepted as "universally
recognized as law." RAl sToN, THE LAW AND PROCEDURE OF INTERNATIONAL TRmunALS (rev.
ed. 1926) § 30. The Mixed Claims Commission, in an opinion which involved the Interpre-
tation of an ambiguous clause in the Berlin Treaty, adopted the principle in the follow-
ing words,
"The treaty is based upon the resolution of the Congress of the United States, accepted
and adopted by Germany. The language, being that of the United States and framed for
its benefit, will be strictly construed against it." Opinion in the Lusitania Cases, Nov. 12,
1923, reprinted in (1924) 18 Am. J. INT. L. 361, 373.
68. The following excerpt from AMll, John Stuart, Treaty Obligations (1870) 8 FoRT'-
NiGErmy Ray. (N.S.) 715, written with reference to the Russian denunciation at the time
of the Franco-Prussian War of the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris of 1856, may
serve as an example of eminent lay opinion:
"Nations should be willing to abide by the rules. They should abstain from imposing
conditions which, on any just and reasonable view of human affairs, cannot be expected
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national law, which is thoroughly practical, has taken account of this
obvious truth for, whereas the general rule of pacta servanda sunt is con-
sidered the basic principle, yet the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus has long
been recognized as its corollary.6" This principle, pithily stated as
"omnis conventio intelligitur rebus sic stantibus," means that when essen-
tial and motivating conditions which were in the contemplation of both
parties at the time of signing a treaty, not concluded for any stated
period of time, have suffered a substantial change or if unforeseen cir-
cumstances of an important nature have arisen, then the treaty obliga-
tions affected by the change are no longer binding on the contracting
parties. That this doctrine, involving the interpretation of such phrases
as "essential and motivating conditions" and "a substantial change," is
a dangerous one cannot be denied, as it opens the door to unilateral
denunciation of treaties by nations who have tired of and feel they are
strong enough to disregard some irksome obligation.7 Yet the clausula
has frequently been read into and applied to treaties during the nine-
teenth century,71 especially to provisions for unilateral demilitariza-
tion,72 such as the prohibition to fortify Huningen in Alsace imposed
to be kept. And they should conclude their treaties as commercial treaties are usually con-
cluded, only for a term of years .....
"It is the misfortune of such stipulations, even if as temporary arrangements they might
have been justifiable, that if included for permanency they are seldom got rid of without
some lawless act on the part of the nation bound by them. If a lawless act, then, has been
committed in the present instance, it does not entitle those who imposed the conditions to
consider the lawlessness only, and to dismiss the more important consideration, whether,
even if it was wrong to throw off the obligation, it would not be still more wrong to par-
sist in enforcing it. If, though not fit to be perpetual, it has been imposed in perpetuity,
the question when it becomes right to throw it off is but a question of time. No time hav-
ing been fixed, Russia fixed her own time, and naturally chose the most convenient."
69. Garner, Revision of Treaties and the Doctrine of Rebus Sic Stantlbus (1934) 19
IowA L. REy. 312, is a clear and comprehensive discussion of the various views held con-
cerning the doctrine and of its application to treaties by national and international tri-
bunals. See also, 1 OPPmEa:=, op. cit. supra note 67, § 539; Williams, The Perma'ence
of Treaties, the Doctrine of Rebus Sic Stantibus, and Article 19 of the Covenant of tIe
League (1928) 22 A.m. J. INT. L. 89; LAUT.ERPAC T, THE Fumcrio.N or L TnW l: va m-
zqATioNAL Coiiurorm (1933) 277; Bullington, International Treaties and the Clau-c "Rebus
Sic Stantibus" (1927) 76 U. oP PA. L. REv. 153. The doctrine is of long standin. and was
invoked by Queen Elizabeth, 2 Zoucan Jums Er JuoDie FarA.S snv Junis aer G ,r-m
ExpxrcAno (Brierly's translation, 1911) 102; Spinoza was among the first to formulate
it in the sphere of international law, Tractatus Politicus, c. UI, § 14, s 2 OmAs, (1853)
324.
70. Wn=Airs, CHAPTERs ON CuRRENT LnmwATioiAL LAw Aim trn LEnn or NATioNS
(1929) 91, states: "The doctrine is not that a State has a unilateral right to declare itself
not bound by a subsisting contract; it is that the treaty itself has gone, since an essential
condition in which it was concluded has disappeared...."
But this definition does not make possible a frictionless application of the doctrine.
71. See KAyFSLAN, EaRIc, DAs WESEN DES V-OLnmmc z s M Em CLAUSU nanUS
sic smurrrss (1911) 12-37.
72. "Conspicuous among treaties doomed by their nature to obsolescence are thoz2 by
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upon France by the Treaty of Paris of 1815,11 and the clauses of the
Treaty of Paris of 1856 which neutralized the Black Sea. 4 As recently
as February 3, 1935, France and Great Britain have admitted the prin-
ciple with respect to the obligations of Germany under Part V of the
Versailles Treaty, offering to abrogate these provisions as a condition
of certain political readjustments.7h  Turning to our own history we find
that the convention of 1817 between the United States and Great Britain
whereby the armament of the two nations on the Great Lakes was limit-
ed has also been disregarded under stress of altered circumstances; dur-
ing the Canadian Revolution of 1837-38 the British Government largely
increased its naval armament in those waters without asking the per-
mission of the United States, and during the Civil War our government
did likewise."6
The inexpediency of seeking to impose perpetual treaty obligations 1
has been recognized by the Great Powers in recent years71 and even at
which a State defeated in war is obliged to abstain from fortifying or otherwise making
free use of some part of its territory, when the restriction is not imposed as forming part
of a system of permanent neutrality." 1 WEsTLAxE, INTMNATIoNAL LAW (2d cd. 1910)
296.
73. Denounced, soon after its accession to power, by the provisional government of 1848
on the ground that there had been a complete change in the moral outlook of the French
Government.
74. Denounced by Russia in 1870. Her wishes were complied with by the London
Conference of 1871, although only after lip service to the doctrine pacta servanda sunt
had first been given by the adoption of the following declaration: "C'est un prinelpe es-
sential du droit des gens qu'aucune Puissance ne peut se d6lier des engagements d'un traIt6,
ni en modifier les stipulations, qu'h la suite de l'assentiment des parties contractantes, au
moyen d'une entente amicale.' Yet Russia, who was among the nations signing this declar-
ation, in 1886 denounced Article 59 of the Treaty of Berlin of 1878, which stipulated that
Batum should be a free port. See Pouprrca, REBus Sic STA "mus (1918) 116.
75. N. Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1935, at 1, col. 8; id. Feb. 4, 1935, at 1, col. 6.
76. For other instances of the application of the principle in the history of the United
States see FosTER, TnE PAcnicE or Dip.oarAcy (1906) 301-305.
77. Fosm-, op. cit. supra note 76, at 299 gives the following amusing illustration:
"Francis I and Henry VIII concluded a 'perpetual peace' in 1527 between France and Eng-
land, and on the one part there were given as hostages two archbishops, eleven bishops,
twenty-eight nobles, and thirteen towns; but even these did not prevent a fresh war In the
same generation." While his interpretation of the Treaty of London of 1527 is erroneous,
in that the magnates and municipalities mentioned merely pledged their possessions as ge-
curity [2 Bernard, Recueil des Traitez (1700) 147], this does not vitiate the aptness of the
illustration.
78. Wilson, R. R., Revision Clauses in Treaties since the World War (1934) 28 Am.
PoL. Scr. REv. 901. The writer stresses the necessity of permitting needed changes and,
after a review of some 200 "revision" clauses in engagements made by the seven Great
Powers from the World War to 1932, arrives at the conclusion: "Finally, the post-war
period has seen, not a relinquishment of the rule pacta servanda sunt, but at least some
evidence of a realization that pacta, if they are to be really effective, should be consistent
with actual conditions, and should thus reflect the continuing will of the party states." Id,
at 909.
GERMAN REARMIAMENT
the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus
was accepted in practice as regards certain treaties of the past,70 in
principle, with reference to the future. Article 19 of the Covenant of
the League of Nations reads:
"The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by Members
of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the considera-
.tion of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace
of the world."
Unfortunately the means provided for carrying the principle expressed
in Article 19 into effect are such as to make it, for practical purposes, a
nullity.s0
Even if the Versailles Treaty were wholly silent as to the European
public policy involved in disarming Germany, it could scarcely be argued
that it envisaged, as a condition of such a plan, a permanently disarmed
Great Power in Europe."' But it is unnecessary to invoke an implied
rebus sic stantibus with reference to Part V of the Versailles Treaty.
No such abnormal condition of permanent inequality was incorporated
in that section by its framers.
"When the draft of the Peace Treaty of Versailles," writes Professor
Noel Baker,8" "was first presented to the German Delegation in May,
1919, they made the following observation upon Part V: 'Germany is
prepared to agree to the basic idea of the army, navy and air regula-
tions.., provided this is a beginning of a general reduction of arma-
ments.' To which the Allied Powers in their famous answer replied as
follows:
"'The Allied and Associated Powers wish to make it clear that their require-
ments in regard to German armaments were not made solely with the object
of rendering it impossible to resume her policy of military aggression. They
are also the first steps towards that general reduction and limitation of arma-
ments which they seek to bring about as one of the most fruitful preventives of
war, and which it will be one of the first duties of the League of Nations to
promote.'"
79. Article 435 of the Treaty of Versailles declares that certain clauses of the European
settlement of 1815 concerning the neutralized zone of Savoy and the free zones of Upp r
Savoy and Gex "are no longer consistent with pre-ent conditions" and therefore the High
Contracting Parties, some of whom participated in the Congres of Vienna, are willing to
accept a modification thereof.
80. OPPEZ-HEm=, op. cit. supra note 67, § 167 (o).
81. "A treaty that is to endure for all eternity and to be supported, without limitation
in time, by the armed force of the contracting Powers, is as great an absurdity as a will
that is to regulate for all time the descent of the property of a testator .... Nor can the
world be ruled by a system of a perpetual and unbreakable international entail." WILLI.a_5,
INTERAmONAL PEAcE AND InEATiONAL CHAz~c (1932) 2.
82. BAEE, PmsA=AmNT (1926) 25. The author is Professor of International Rela-
tions in the University of London.
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The Notes thus exchanged are, under the established practice of Inter-
national law, to be considered as a binding interpretation of Part V of
the Treaty and would seem to be included in the category of "rights ac-
corded to Germany under such provisions. 88 Accordingly the govern-
ments of Europe, Professor Baker concludes, are under a legal obliga-
tion to disarm. 4 Unfortunately, they have not carried out this obliga-
tion despite numerous conferences since the World War. Under these
circumstances, even if this country had a clear legal right to insist on
German disarmament and from the beginning had had a definite inten-
tion to claim such a right, it would seem somewhat surprising for the
United States to advance such a claim. France and Great Britain are
apparently prepared to abandon it, at least in part. They once had it;
we never did.
Part V, however, contains additional proof that a perpetual disarma-
ment of Germany was not contemplated. Article 164 begins with the
words "Up till the time at which Germany is admitted as a member of
the League of Nations, the German army must not possess an armament
greater than the amounts fixed" in the Tables annexed. And, according
to the later paragraphs in the same article, Germany agreed that "the
armaments fixed in the said Table" should remain in force until they
were modified by the Council of the League. This would seem to indi-
cate that the treaty-makers had in mind some rearmament of Germany
after she had entered the League.85
The Actual Application of Part V in Recent Years
The United States had never, up to the time of the Press Release
publicly intimated that it claimed any rights under Part V; in fact, its
actions have indicated a contrary conclusion. The United States was
never represented on the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control which
supervised and enforced the execution of the disarmament clauses,8
although the Military Commission, at least, remained in Germany for
more than five years after the Treaty of Berlin came into effect.87 Fur-
83. Article VIII of the Covenant also promises general disarmament.
84. BAER, DISARMAMNT (1926) 25.
85. The same argument is advanced in a leading article "A Debate on Realities," Lon-
don Times, May 31, 1934, at 15, col. 2.
86. NorLET, UNE EXPiRI.NCE Ds D9SAnMRMET (2d ed. 1932) 12. "On salt que lea
9tats-Unis s'abstinrent totalement ..... L'abstention des 3tats-Unis cr6a, en tout cas, une
vacance b la pr~sidence de la sous-commission des fortifications, qui avait 06 reserv&e pour
un g~ner.U amricain."
87. ROQUES, Lt CONTROLE MILTAIRE INTERALLIA EN ALLEMAGNE, Stn MDRE 1919-
JANv ER 1927 (1927) 144, states that the last members of the commission left Germany on




thermore, the United States was represented on the Conference of Am-
bassadors not by a diplomat who cast a vote, but by an observerY8 It is
wholly unlikely that the representative of the United States signed the
letter of August 21, 1926, addressed to the Secretary General of the
League of Nations,89 referred to in the Press Release' and which made
a vital link in the chain of reasoning leading up to its conclusion. It
seems inconceivable that the Senators who voted for the Berlin Treaty
in 1921 thought that they were thereby submitting the definition of an
American right claimed under that treaty to the ambassadors of Great
Britain, France, Italy, and Japan. Furthermore, it seems that the
United States representative at the most recent disarmament conference
was not, in principle, opposed to a certain measure of German rearma-
ment.90 And other departments of our government seem to have pur-
sued a different policy toward Part V than that which the State Depart-
ment now apparently believes itself to have adhered to since 1921'
European governments, other than possibly France, have not in recent
years placed the same interpretation on Part V as our State Department
now does. Reports have long been current in the press that Italy is
more or less openly permitting the dispatch of arms and munitions to
Hungary. The British Government has refused to interfere with the
sale and shipment to Germany of airplane engines to be used "for com-
mercial purposes,"92 although Sir John Simon acknowledged that there
was a double purpose to which many air machines might be putf 3 When
88. N. Y. Times, Mlay 7, 1921, at 1, col. 8.
89. In this same year a protest regarding a munitions plant was lodged in Vienna on
behalf of the Council of Ambassadors by the British, French, Italian, and Japanese Ambas-
sadors. N. Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1926, § II, at 9, col. 2. The decission to terminate the activi-
ties of the Interallied Mlitary Commission in Germany was made at a meeting in Geneva
on Dec. 12, 1926 by the representatives of Great Britain, France, Belgium, Italy, and
Japan. It was the culmination of earlier negotiations in the Council of Ambassadors, dur-
ing which the representative of the United States, a councillor of embassy, was present
only in the role of observer. ROQUEs, op. cit. supra note 87, at 141-142.
90. On his return from the Disarmament Conference in June, 1934, the SwedIsh For-
eign Minister, M. Sandler, in a speech at Mfalmo stated: "The ex-neutrals, like the British,
Italian, and American Governments, have assumed that a certain measure of German re-
armament is unavoidable." London Times, June 11, 1934, at 11, col. 2.
91. N. Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1934, at 8, col. 4; London Times, Sept. 18, 1934, at 12, col. 3;
Id. Sept. 19, 1934, at 10, col. 3; (Nov. 1934) 41 CURRNir HSToRY 200.
92. On Mlay 14, 1934, Sir John Simon, Secretary of State for Foreign Affair-, stated in
the House of Commons: "The fulfillment of the order does not, however, conflict with the
terms of the relevant international instruments.' London Times, May 15, 1934, at 8, col. 4.
See, also Lord Ponsonby's Speech in House of Lords May 7, 1934, reported in London
Times, May 8, 1934, at 7, col 1.
93. Statement made in House of Commons July 30, 1934, reported in London Times.
July 31, 1934, at 8, col. 7. In the same speech Sir John Simon refused to make any
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asked in the House of Commons, with reference to an inquiry which the
French Ambassador had made on the subject of such orders, "whether
his Majesty's Government proposed to take any action," Mr. Baldwin
replied, "The answer . . . is in the negative." 94  The most influential
British newspaper has seconded the Foreign Office"5 in its efforts to en-
courage Europe in the process of "passing from a system of stability
through the military preponderance of France and her associates to one
of stability by balance." 0  These are words of statesmanship which
take account of realities; but the extremely legalistic view advanced in
the Press Release, even if it were based on correct principles of construc-
tion, lacks this sine qua non of any sound international policy. Strange-
ly enough, the United States, not a direct party to the Treaty of Ver-
sailles, which it openly repudiated because of its potential military com-
mitments, seems to have taken a more extreme attitude towards its mili-
tary stipulations than have any of the direct signatories of that Treaty,
at least up until March 20, 1935, when France and Italy protested, not
against the disappearance of Part V, but against its unilateral denuncia-
tion. The result is anomalous.
Finally, it may be noted that when on February 3, 1935, Great Britain
and France proposed to release Germany, on certain conditions, from
Part V of the Treaty of Versailles, it is understood that the United States
was not consulted, its consent being neither asked nor given. Had it
been assumed either by the Allied Governments or by the United States
that we had rights under Part V, it is hardly conceivable that the Allies
would have undertaken to cede American rights or that the United States
would submit to their cession by others. This would seem to establish
conclusively, if further evidence were needed, that neither the Allied
statement as to whether Germany was observing her obligations in the Peace Treaties
with regard to military air forces, which would amount to charges that would naturally
lead to a demand for proof, although admitting that her air development was very
marked. Ibid.
94. London Times, May 17, 1934, at 7, col. 3.
95. For the British Government's attitude see Sir John Simon's speech at Geneva, May
30, 1934, reported in London Times, May 31, 1934 at 14, col. 1, and Prime Minister
MacDonald's speech at Seaham Harbor, June 14, 1934, reported in id., June 15, at 18, col. 2,
wherein he said: "Again and again when we were negotiating these things it was made per-
fectly dear that Germany would be treated on terms of equality, and so far as this country
is concerned she will. We have passed our word, and it will be carried out."
96. Leading article "The Arms Outlook," London Times, May 9, 1934, at 15, col. 2.
See also, Leading Articles id., May 28, 1934, at 15, col. 2; May 30, at 15, col. 4; May 31,
at 15, col. 2; June 1, at 17, col. 2. This newspaper is believed to mirror the views of the
Foreign Office accurately; for an example fully substantiated by documentary proof, see




Governments nor the United States seriously conceived American rights,
advantages, or benefits to be involved in Part V of the Treaty of Ver-
sailles.
Conclhsion
Thus, viewed from any angle, the opinion that Germany by rearm-
ing would violate the treaty rights of this country cannot be sustained.
The literal text of the treaty, the interpretation thereof at the time of
its passage, the debates concerning the resolutions on which it was based,
and its construction according to the accepted principles of international
law do not admit of such a conclusion. The delegates who drew up the
Versailles Treaty did not envisage perpetual inequality for Germany;
and the majority of foreign governments have not acted on such an as-
sumption. Even if the initiation of a general limitation of armaments
had not been expressly asserted to be the motive for exacting the clauses
of Part V, some such understanding would have to be implied to save
such conditions, if assumed to be perpetual, from being considered
anomalous. To continue to apply a contract literally when circum-
stances have changed, or when events on the occurrence of which it was
predicated have not come to pass, would be in effect to change the bar-
gain which the parties have made. Even France and Great Britain have
given tangible evidence of their belief in the obsolescence of Part V. Fur-
thermore, ever since 1919 the overwhelming current of opinion in this
country has been strongly opposed to American interference in Euro-
pean affairs; and this government's representatives abroad have con-
sistently refused to promise co-operation in any project tending to such
a result.97
The interpretation proclaimed by the Press Release might, were it the
result of deliberation, indicate a radical change of policy. It is not
within the scope of this article to discuss the exigency which may have
led the State Department to take such an unusual step. 8 Nor is this
the place to consider the past attitude of the United States with regard
97. Sir John Simon made every effort to include in the British Draft Convention at
Geneva a Consultative Pact looking forward to the application of economic sanctions
phrased in such terms as to secure American support, but confesed that Mr. Norman Davie
declaration at Geneva, made with the authority of the United States government had ren-
dered this hope vain. London Times, May 19, 1934, at 7, col. 3.
98. The policy first received publicity at the recent Senate Committee Investigation of
the American munitions industry, at which a memorandum of August 5, 1933, prepared by
the State Department after inquiry had been made by the representative of a foreign gov-
ernment, was produced. The policy was first outlined in a confidential memorandum to
President Hoover from Secretary Stimson in May, 1931. New York Times, Sept. 19, 1934,
at 8, col. 4; London Times, Sept. 19, 1934, at 10, col. 3.
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to treaty violations. 99 The suggestion that German armament implies
an American treaty violation may prove portentous, for it invites and
has resulted in a request to vindicate the violation and plunge the United
States into commitments which the Knox Resolution repudiated. The
Press Release should be withdrawn or overruled, and the Department of
State should make it clear that the rearmament of Germany, whatever
may be thought about it, is not a violation of the Treaty of Berlin.
99. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U. S. 581 (1889); Charlton v. Kelly, 220
U. S. 447 (1913).
